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Abstract 
I study a sequential process in which different pairs of traders bargain over the terms of 
trade of an indivisible good. I consider both one-sided and two-sided offers based 
bargaining at the stage-game l vel. The sequential process is modelled as an infinite 
stage-game of incomplete information and the paper studies the efficiency properties of its 
equilibria. It is shown: With one-sided offers, all equilibria re long-run ex post efficient; 
with two-sided offers, examples of equilibria re constructed with widely varying efficiency 
properties. 
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1. Introduction 
In several economic transactions - examples include housing contracts, used 
car sales, labour agreements - the terms of trade are determined through bilateral 
bargaining between individual agents who are (mutually) imperfectly informed 
about their opponent's valuation for the good. An interesting question in such 
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contexts is whether the bilateral bargaining is efficient i.e., if it realizes all the 
potential gains from trade. For bargaining between any single pair of agents this 
question has been answered in the negative by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). 
They showed that with two-sided incomplete information there does not exist any 
trading rule/mechanism which can realize ex post efficient outcomes. 
In this paper, I locate the bilateral bargaining between any two agents within a 
sequence of similar bargaining interactions between different traders. This sequen- 
tiality of trading creates the possibility that agents can access historical data 
concerning bargaining between similar traders in the past. A good example of this 
possibility is the bargaining between a buyer and a seller in the housing market; 
typically, both sides check if similar houses have been recently bought and sold 
and if so, at what price, before proceeding with their own bargaining. I study the 
role of such information transmission (and the consequent learning) in the process 
of bilateral bargaining. More specifically, I ask if some standard one-sided offers 
and two-sided offers trading mechanisms realize all gains from trade in the long 
run, as a consequence of learning from the past? 
The sequence of bargaining interactions i  formally studied as an infinite 
stage-game of incomplete information. Bargaining rules based on one-sided offers 
as well as two-sided offers are considered, at the stage game level. The one-sided 
offers game is modelled via the take-it-or-leave-it offer and the two-sided offers 
bargaining is based on simultaneous sealed bids. The principal results concern 
learning and ex post efficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria in the infinite game. An 
equilibrium is said to be long-run (LR) ex post efficient if for all stages after some 
finite stage, outcomes correspond to the ex post efficient outcomes. A related issue 
of interest is the nature of long-run learning of true valuations. I shall say that 
complete learning occurs when traders' beliefs assign (roughly speaking) point 
mass on the true valuation of their opponent. In what follows, I use the term 
generic to denote vents that happen with probability i given a trader's prior belief 
concerning his opponent's valuation. 
In the game with one-sided offers it is shown that every equilibrium is LR ex 
post efficient (Theorem 2) and that learning by the active side of the market is 
incomplete, generically (Theorem 3). In the one-sided offers case, the focus is on 
learning by the side of the market hat makes the offers. Valuations of traders are 
said to be compatible if the buyer's valuation is strictly greater than the valuation 
of the seller; and valuations are said to be incompatible, if the buyer's valuation is 
strictly less than that of the seller. Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.2.1 show that 
when valuations are incompatible l arning is always incomplete. Proposition 2.2 
shows that if valuations are compatible then, after a finite stage, trade takes place 
at the same price forever. This implies that in such cases learning ceases after a 
finite stage. Since, at any finite stage, the support of a trader's posterior belief has 
a non-degenerate support, this also shows that in any equilibrium, for such 
valuations, teaming will be incomplete. These results put together yield Theorem 
3: in any equilibrium learning is incomplete, generically. 
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For the game with two-sided offers bargaining the analysis is done via a set of 
examples. These examples illustrate the range of possible outcomes that can obtain 
in the equilibria of the infinite stage game. I begin by constructing equilibria with 
little or no learning, and poor efficiency properties. On closer scrutiny it becomes 
clear that the inefficiency in these equilibria rises out of the 'stand-off' nature of 
the stage game strategies: traders make bids/offers which they know, given their 
posterior beliefs, will result in trade with zero probability. This observation helps 
me to construct an equilibrium with the LR ex post efficiency property. It is also 
shown that in this equilibrium, learning is generically incomplete. These examples 
suggest that in the two-sided offers case, though LR ex post efficiency" is 
attainable, one cannot hope for the strong general results obtained in the one-sided 
offers case. 
The results of this paper are related to several strands of the literature. I now 
discuss these relationships briefly. 
In recent years the study of the welfare properties of decentralized trading has 
been an active area of research, (see, for example, Symposium on Non-Cooper- 
ative Bargaining in The Journal of Economic Theory (1989), the survey paper by 
Wilson (1987) and the papers cited therein). An important component of this 
research as been the search for efficient mechanisms. A mechanism defines, in 
this setting, a game of incomplete information, which is usually solved using the 
concept of Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. For a mechanism to be efficient one require- 
ment might be that all Bayes-Nash equilibria of the game thus defined are (in a 
suitable sense) efficient. An even stronger equirement might be that such effi- 
ciency obtains for a class of environments (cf. uniform efficiency, Wilson (1987)). 
I explore both these requirements in this paper. In particular, Theorem 2 estab- 
lishes that in markets with sequential trading, the take-it-or-leave-it offer trading 
mechanism fulfils both these requirements. Taken together with the examples for 
the two-sided offers case this suggests that the one-sided offers based bargaining 
rule has very attractive welfare properties. 
In this connection, it is worth mentioning a recent paper by Ausubel and 
Deneckere (1993), who show (roughly speaking) that for the single good bargain- 
ing problem the one-sided offers trading rule can approximately attain the ex-ante 
efficient expected utilities. The analysis in my paper concerns welfare properties 
of different trading rules in the context of an infinite sequence of one-shot 
bargains. In this context, the main result for one-sided offers bargaining, Theorem 
2, shows that the take-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining has good welfare properties. 
This result can be seen as strengthening the case for such one-sided offers trading 
rules, as well as providing some basis for their widespread use. 
The results on incomplete learning are of independent interest. In particular, 
Theorem 3 is closely related to results in Aghion et al. (1991). Aghion et al. 
(1991) consider an example with a long-lived (dynamic optimizing) monopoly 
selling repeatedly to a myopic consumer whose valuation is private information 
and distributed uniformly over the unit interval. They show that learning will 
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typically be incomplete, and with positive probability it will stop at some finite 
point. I examine a model in which both sides of the market are myopic; however, 
the distribution of the buyer's valuation is no longer estricted to be uniform and is 
quite general. Theorem 3 shows that if valuations are compatible then learning 
ceases at some finite point and long-run learning will, therefore, be incomplete, 
with probability 1. In view of the existing results on incomplete l arning, this is 
not a particularly surprising result; the incentives to experiment and hence learn 
are lower for myopic agents as compared to long-sighted agents. The results 
reported here, however, help clarify the relationship between efficiency and 
learning in deterministic multi-agent settings. The existing literature suggests that 
incomplete l arning, though ex ante optimal, may be 'inadequate' or undesirable 
since it might prevent he attainment of ex post optimal outcomes. In contrast, 
Theorem 3 and Example 3 show that for a general class of markets with bilateral 
trading, 'aggregate' ex post efficiency obtains, though learning is generically 
incomplete. The paper may also be interpreted as a study of the long-run 
behaviour of a sequence of one-shot Bayes-Nash equilibria. An interesting issue is: 
Does this sequence converge to Nash play with respect to the 'true game', i.e., the 
stage-game with the actual valuations of the traders? There is a large literature on 
the subject of learning to play equilibrium, (see the surveys by Blume and Easley 
(1992,1993) and the papers referred to therein). In particular, Jordan (1991) 
examines this issue for finite action games in which players know their own 
pay-offs but do not know their opponent's pay-offs. He shows that under some 
conditions this convergence does occur. The examples in this paper suggest that in 
the context of infinite action stage-games, convergence of strategies to Nash 
equilibrium strategies may not reflect any learning of pay-offs of the true game. In 
particular, Example 1 in the discussion on two-sided offers is revealing: there is no 
learning and yet the (stationary) Bayes-Nash strategies constitute a Nash equilib- 
rium with respect o any true game. On the other hand, Example 3 presents an 
equilibrium in which there is learning, and the sequence of one-stage Bayes-Nash 
equilibria also converges to some Nash equilibrium of the true game, for all 
possible such games. 
The paper is organized in five parts. In Section 2 the model is formally 
developed. Section 3 presents the general results with one-sided offers and section 
4 presents three examples for two-sided offers based bargaining. Section 5 
concludes. The proofs are given in the appendix at the end of the paper. 
2. The model 
Consider pairs of traders, comprising of one buyer and one seller, meeting to 
trade an indivisible good at discrete points in time. Both traders have personal 
valuations for the good which are private knowledge. These valuations are 
identical across the stages for all buyers and all sellers, respectively. Traders know 
this fact, and have priors on these valuations. Thus in every stage-game a new pair 
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of traders enters, with prior beliefs about opponent's valuations, observes out- 
comes of past bargaining, updates these prior beliefs and then bargains over the 
terms of trade. This bargaining is based on either one-sided offers or two-sided 
simultaneous offers. One-sided offer bargaining takes the form of the take-it-or- 
leave-it offer game: one side makes an offer, if the other side accepts the offer 
then they exchange the good, otherwise not. In either case that ends the transac- 
tion. In the two-sided offers case traders simultaneously submit a sealed-bid. The 
good is exchanged if the buyer's bid exceeds that of the seller's, at a price midway 
between the two bids; if the bids are incompatible no trade is realized. The traders 
then exit. The outcome of this bargaining is observed by the next stage traders and 
the process begins afresh. 
This structure is somewhat special - in particular, if different raders enter each 
stage then the assumption that they all have identical valuations eems to be quite 
restrictive. The analysis of such a model is nevertheless interesting because, I 
believe, the insights that one can obtain in this simple setting also carry over to 
more realistic settings. As an illustration consider the following setting: In each 
period a pair of different raders meet to bargain over the terms of trade of an 
indivisible good. The valuations of the sellers are drawn in each stage from some 
finite set of valuations whereas the (privately known) valuations of the buyers are 
identical over time. Suppose that traders are perfectly informed about the valua- 
tions (of their predecessors) on their side of the market. Also assume that the 
sellers side of the market makes the offers and the buyers respond by accepting or 
rejecting the offers. In such a setting, a seller learns from the history of trades not 
just of sellers with the same valuation as himself but also from those with different 
valuations. The learning and efficiency properties of the equilibria of the game 
defined by such a trading process can, however, be analyzed using the same 
methods as those reported in this paper. I now briefly outline how this is done. 
At any stage, the learning from history is reflected in the posterior distribution 
of the seller. The seller makes an offer which optimizes one-period pay-offs given 
these beliefs and his own valuation. Using arguments in section 3.3 it is possible 
to show that, eventually, sellers with valuations lower than the buyers' valuation 
will settle down on one offer which is accepted by buyers. The seller types with 
valuations higher than the buyers' valuation, on the other hand, will keep making 
offers higher than the buyers' valuation and no trade will occur. The principal 
results on LR ex post efficiency and generic incomplete learning, Theorems 2 and 
3, thus extend, in a natural way to this setting. 
I next briefly discuss the case in which the valuations of the buyers side (i.e., 
the 'responding side' of the market) are allowed to vary, whereas those on the 
sellers side are identical, over time. There are different ways in which this may be 
formulated. One possibility is the following formulation: z There is a myopic 
2 I am grateful to the associate editor for suggesting this formulation. 
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seller making offers to short lived buyers with valuations drawn from some 
distribution. The interesting situation here is one in which the sellers do not know 
the distribution of the buyers' valuations (note that if the distribution is known to 
the sellers then there is little that they can learn by observing past trades, since the 
valuations are randomly drawn in every period). The problem of learning the 
parameters of an unknown distribution is, however, a special case of the single 
agent learning problem which has been extensively studied in the literature. A well 
known result in this area concerns incomplete learning of the parameters of the 
distribution by a long lived agent (for the relevant references see the surveys by 
Blume and Easley (1992), (1993)). In this context, it is worth noting that since the 
objective of the seller is the maximization of the one-period expected profits, even 
if he knew the true distribution, the optimal offer will typically be in the interior of 
the support of the buyers' distribution. This suggests that, in this setting, the 
appropriate notion of ex post efficiency is different from the one we consider in 
the present paper (el. Definition 2.2. below). 
An alternative formulation of varying buyers' valuations is the following: The 
buyers tart off with a privately known valuation which changes at some point to 
some new privately known valuation. Assume that the myopic seller knows the 
general structure of the process but does not know the initial valuation, the point 
of change or the final valuation. In such a setting, in addition to the questions 
concerning learning and ex post efficiency there is also the interesting issue of 
how the historical experience affects the behaviour of the offers sequence (even 
after the change in buyers' valuations). In some simple examples (and for some 
specific valuations) I have been able to show that ex post efficiency as well as 
incomplete leaming obtain. A general treatment of this model, however, falls 
outside the scope of the present paper. 
In passing, I should add that an alternative interpretation of the model in its 
present form is that it is an infinitely repeated game with two-sided incomplete 
information between two myopic players. 
I now proceed with a formal description of the trading process as an infinite 
stage-game of incomplete information (Harsanyi, 1967-8). 
2.1. The game 
1. Order of Play: Denote stages by n = 1,2,3 . . . . .  At each stage a different pair 
of traders, comprising of one buyer and one seller, meets to trade an indivisible 
good. I refer to the bargaining between the traders at the n th stage, as the n th stage 
game. 
2. Two-sided Incomplete Information: Traders have personal valuations for the 
good: v b for the buyer and v s for the seller. These valuations are respectively 
identical across the stages. Buyers (sellers) consider vs (v b) to be a random 
variable, v b and v s are assumed to be stochastically independent. Each buyer 
(seller) on entry has a prior distribution F (G) over the v~ (vb). As in Myerson 
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and Satterthwaite (1983), I assume that F and G are continuously differentiable, 
the density functions exist, are continuous and that F ' (x )  =f(x )  > 0, and G'(x)  
= g(x )  > 0, for all x ~ [0,1]. The minimal assumptions on F and G suggest hat 
the class of environments under consideration is fairly general. 
3. Bargaining Procedure: Two different bargaining procedures are considered: 
One-sided offers and two-sided offers. In the one-sided offer case a trader makes a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer to which the opponent responds with an acceptance or a 
rejection. On acceptance, the good is exchanged at the price defined by the offer; 
on rejection, no exchange takes place. Irrespective of the outcome, traders exit. In 
the analysis below we speak, for expositional simplicity, in terms of the seller's 
offer game and refer to it as the seller's game; the entire analysis can be 
reproduced in terms of the buyer's offer game. Denote by s~ the offer by the seller 
at the n th stage. The buyer's decision is either accept(a) or reject(r). On 
acceptance of s n the good is exchanged at price of pn = s n and the pay-offs to the 
buyer and seller are ( v b -p~)  and ( p~ - Vs) , respectively. 
In the two-sided offer case, traders submit offers b~ and s~. The good is 
exchanged if b~ >/s~, at a price, Pn = (b~ + s~)/2. The pay-offs are as defined in 
the one-sided offer case. We refer to this procedure as the simultaneous sealed bid 
game. 
The formal analysis of the one-sided offers game (in section 3) considers the 
case in which the same side of the market makes the offers in all the stages. I
believe that the arguments presented in that case can also be used to analyze the 
case where, across the stages, different sides of the market make take-it-or-leave-it 
offers. 3 
4. Preferences: Traders are risk-neutral and maximize expected earnings. 
Denote by 7r~ and ~ the expected earnings for the seller and the buyer, 
respectively. These pay-offs are determined by b~ and s~ with the expectations 
conditioned on the posterior beliefs of the traders, F~ and G~, respectively. To 
understand the evolution of these posterior beliefs, we next describe the flow of 
information across stages. 
5. History: For any stage n, the observed set is H = {T,NT}, where T--- {trade} 
and NT = {no trade}. Denote by h~ the actual outcome; thus h~ = {T} or {NT}, 
3 TO see how this can be done, consider the example with uniform priors presented in section 3.1. 
Assume, for simplicity, that he sellers (buyers) ide makes offers in odd (even) numbered stages. Also 
assume that raders observe the offers and the trade outcomes ofall previous stages. I now sketch the 
argument for the efficiency result in this setting. From the discussion i section 3.1 it follows that he 
sellers ide completely reveals its valuation through the first period offer. Thus in subsequent stages, 
buyers will always be able to trade by making an offer equal to the valuation of the sellers; the stages 
in which the sellers make an offer can be analyzed along the lines of section 3. These observations put 
together yield the efficiency result. 
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n __ n -  1 hn 1 and define history at stage n, as h - {hk}~= 1 where ~ H" -  = H × H × ...  × 
H. It is assumed that stage 1 traders tart from zero history. (More generally, from 
now on, subscripts denote single period outcomes and superscripts he sequence 
until that stage. I also use h n = {NT} or {T}, to denotes histories where Vk < n, 
h k --{NT} or {T}, respectively.) Information conveyed across time is thus rather 
minimal and one can imagine a large class of environments/markets which will 
satisfy this requirement. 
Richer information transmission can be modelled easily, within this framework. 
A natural candidate for such a more informative history would be one which 
incorporates the sequence of actual prices, p~, at which trade occurs. The results 
on efficiency and learning presented below extend m such histories in a natural 
way. 
6. Strategies: Seller's game: At any stage n, a seller's pure strategy is a 
function, s n, that maps his personal valuation, vs, and the history of past 
outcomes, h~, into the set of the possible offers that he can make, given by [0,1]. 
Formally, sn: [0,1] x H ~- 1 ~ [0,1]. The buyer's pure strategy, b,, is a function 
that maps his personal valuation, vb, and the offer he receives from the seller, sn 
into the set of possible actions for him, given by {a,r}. Formally, b,: [0,1] × [0,1] 
{a,r}. 
Simultaneous sealed bid game: In the two sided offers case both the buyer and 
the seller make offers and the buyer's pure strategy is defined exactly as the 
seller's trategy, i.e., b~: [0,1] × H ~- 1 ~ [0,1]. I restrict myself to pure strategies 
in this paper. 
For stage n, denote by S b and S~ the pure strategy set of the buyer and the 
seller, respectively. Also denote by S~ - b s S, X S, the strategy set for the n th pair. 
The strategy set until stage n is then defined as S " -1= I-I~-~S k. Denote the 
strategy pair for traders at stage game n by t~ = (bn, s,). 
7. Beliefs: At each stage a buyer and a seller enter with private valuations, vb 
and vs, respectively, and prior belief about heir opponent's valuations, denoted by 
F and G, respectively. They know (in equilibrium) the strategies of previous 
traders. After entry, they observe the history of past play, h~. Given his private 
valuation, the buyer (seller) can then reconstruct the offers made by his predeces- 
sors, and the possible responses of the corresponding sellers (buyers). Using this 
knowledge of offers, the resulting outcomes and hence the set of potential 
responses, he then updates his priors with the help of Bayes' Rule. 
Let d, = {F~, G,}, the following notation concerning the support of the belief 
distributions i extensively used: ug(v~) denotes the supremum and lg(vs) refers to 
the infimum, respectively of the support of G,. u~(v b) and l~(v b) denote the 
corresponding values for the beliefs of the buyer. The support of the limiting 
beliefs, (G*, F*), is defined in terms of u~(v s) and l*(v~) for the seller and 
u~(v b) and l~(v b) for the buyer. To avoid excessive notation, posterior beliefs are 
not shown to depend on private valuations; I will on occasion also omit mention of 
these valuations while discussing the support of beliefs. 
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Bayes' Rule cannot be applied when a player encounters zero probability 
events, e.g., histories which could have happened along the equilibrium path, only 
with zero probability. I assume that when faced with such histories traders use a 
pre-specified rule, which is discussed below (see Definition 2.1). 
2.1.1. The equilibrium concept 
An equilibrium is an infinite sequence of strategy-belief pairs, {t,, dn}~= 1,such 
that for every stage n, given any history, h n, the beliefs of the traders, dn, are well 
defined, and the strategy pair for the stage game, t~, constitutes a Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium with respect to these beliefs. 
Updated beliefs are derived using Bayes' Rule as long as a player observes 
histories that occur with positive probability along the equilibrium path. I next 
consider the evolution of beliefs off the equilibrium path. In my model, due to the 
two-sided nature of incomplete information, an off-the-equilibrium-path history 
may not be immediately detected as a deviation, by both the players. This problem 
is further complicated by the minimal information that is transmitted across stages. 
In view of the absence of any strategic link across stages this issue is, however, 
not central to the analysis. I therefore adopt a simple convention when players 
learn that the previous history is off the equilibrium path: when it is common- 
knowledge that a history is inconsistent with equilibrium strategies then both 
players choose to ignore any information the history contains and revert to their 
prior beliefs. All traders know this rule and so subsequent players can use the 
truncated history starting at this stage game. 
Formally, I denote histories that are consistent with equilibrium strategies as 
consistent histories, and those that are inconsistent with equilibrium strategies as 
inconsistent histories. If it is common knowledge at stage n that a history is 
inconsistent then players, at subsequent stages, use the truncated history from 
stage n onwards. I refer to such histories as n stage onward consistent histories. 
When a history is privately known to be inconsistent but this inconsistency is not 
common knowledge, then no restriction is imposed on the beliefs. 
It may seem as though the complications in this formalization arise due to the 
assumption that traders do not observe prices at which previous trades take place. 
To some extent his is true; for instance, in the one-sided (seller's) offer case, the 
observation of price offers would immediately reveal the deviations by the seller. 
It is easy to see, however, that the deviations/mistakes made by a buyer are not 
immediately revealed even if the price offers are observed. Thus observing the 
sequence of price offers helps but does not resolve all the difficulties. (For a 
discussion of the complications that arise during the updating process in the 
two-sided offers case, see section 4 below). 
The discussion so far is summarized in the following definition. 
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is a sequence of strategy-belief pairs, {tn, dn}~=l, 
such that: 
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1. Given any particular d,, the strategy pair for the n th stage game, {g,, b~} 
satisfy, 
( i)~'.b(b.(Vb, h") ,s ,  I F .)  ~> ^ ^ I r~(b,g ,  l f f~) ,Vb~[O,1] ,Vvb~[O,1  ] . 
v., h"), I $. I¢o), [0,1], Vvs [0,1], 
2. The beliefs of the traders, d~ -- (F,, G~), are derived using {~, hn}, as follows: 
(a) If it is common knowledge that h ~ is inconsistent w.r.t. ~,  then F, = F,  
G~ = G, VVb, vs E [0,1]; If it is privately but not commonly known that a history 
is inconsistent then no restriction is imposed on beliefs of a player. 
(b) If h ~ is k < (n - 1) onward consistent w.r.t., ~ then, for a seller by an 
application of Bayes' Rule, 
a(x) -G(1~)  
G.( x)  = G(u",) ---~(l~) , for x~ [l~, u~]; 
n G,(x )  = 1, for x > u~, and G, (x )  = 0, for x < lg 
A similar procedure defines F,. 
It is worth discussing two properties of the updating formula presented above. 
One, implicit in the formula for the updated posterior belief is the assumption that 
equilibrium strategies are (weakly) monotonic with respect o personal valuations 
- this generates the interval support for the posterior belief. It is clear from 
Lemma 1.1 below that for the one-sided offers case this is not a restriction. For the 
two-sided offers case the examples considered in section 4 all satisfy the mono- 
tonicity property and so the formula suffices for the purposes of this paper. Two, I 
assume in 2(a) that faced with zero probability events, traders revert to original 
priors. Alternative specifications can easily be considered. One such alternative 
would be to have traders revert to the posterior belief which they held immediately 
before the discovery of the zero probability event. This formulation retains more 
of the already accumulated information than the one presented in the paper. A 
moment's thought, however, reveals that such a modification in the specification 
has no significant effect on the main results. 
2.1.2. Long-run (LR) ex post efficiency 
Given the results of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), one cannot hope to find 
an equilibrium that is ex-post efficient (with any bargaining rule) for all stages of 
the infinite stage game. This motivates the use of a weaker efficiency requirement: 
long-run ex post efficiency. 
For the single bilateral trading problem, ex post efficiency requires that a good 
is transferred from a seller to a buyer if v b > vs, and not traded if v b < v s. I f  
v b > v s and h = {NT}, then loss of welfare is (% - vs), likewise if u b < v s, and 
h = {T}, then welfare loss is (us - Vb). Note that in my model, in both bargaining 
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cases, at any stage either all or none of the gains from trade are realized. This 
allows me to define a long run version of ex post efficiency: 
Definition 2.2. An equilibrium is said to be LR ex post efficient if, for every 
compatible pair (Vb, Vs), there is some N(va, vs), s.t., h k = {T} Vk>N,  and if for 
every incompatible pair (v b, v~), there is some finite N'(v b, v~), s.t., h k = {NT}, 
Vk>~N'(v b, Vs). 
Remark: This definition is much stronger than long-run average x post efficiertcy. 
3. One-sided offers, learning and efficiency 
The main results is this section, Theorems 2 and 3, may be summarized as 
follows: If bargaining proceeds on the basis of one-sided offers then every 
equilibrium of the infinite game is LR ex post efficient and exhibits incomplete 
learning, generically. Theorem 1 establishes the existence of an equilibrium. 
In the seller's game if v b > v s one expects that, in the long-run, sellers would 
extract all the potential surplus, i.e., the limit of the sequence of prices, lirn, ~ =p, 
=p*  = v b. Proposition 2.2 establishes the somewhat surprising result that, after 
some finite point, trade takes place at the same price forever, and this price is, 
typically, strictly lower than the true valuation of the buyer. This incomplete 
surplus extraction by the seller is one aspect of a more general phenomenon: 
long-run learning by the seller, of the buyer's valuation, is generically incomplete. 
I begin with an example which illustrates the intuition behind these general results. 
3.1. An example with uniform priors 
This section illustrates the general results of the next two sections within the 
context of an example where both F and G are uniform distributions. Recall, in the 
one-sided offers bargaining attention is restricted to learning by the active side of 
the market. 
To fix ideas, assume that actual realizations of the valuations are: v b = 15/32; 
v s = 1/4.  Given the requirement of sequential rationality (see Definition 3.1. 
below), it is easy to show that for stage 1, the unique first stage equilibrium is 
given by: sl(v s = 1/4)  = 5/8 ,  and b1(v b = 15/32, s 1 = 5 /8 )  = r. Thus, h z = 
{NT}. The beliefs of the seller at stage 2 may be computed using Bayes' Rule; and 
the optimal offer of the second stage seller is given by s2(v ~ = 1/4,  h 2 = {NT}) = 
7/16. Given that v b = 15/32, the buyer's optimal response, b2(v b = 15/32, 
s 2 = 7/16)  = a. Thus h 2 = (T} and h 3 = {h 1 = NT; h 2 = T}. 
I next show that in this setting, once trade occurs, it occurs forever after. The 
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reason is rather simple. The unique optimal offer, for the seller with valuation 
v s = 1/4, given the history h 3, is s3(v s = 1/4, h3)=7/16 .  Given that b, is 
stationary, it follows that h 3 = {T}. 
Since no additional information will be revealed by the outcome in the 
bargaining at the 3 rd stage game, the unique optimal offer for stage 4 will be 
S4(U s = 1/4, h 4)  - -  s3(v  s - -  1/4, h3), and b4(v b = 15/32, s 4 = 7/16) = a , . . . .  
and so on. Similar reasoning applies to all such pairs. Moreover, given the 
description of equilibrium behaviour, no trade takes place if v b < v s. Thus, the 
equilibrium is LR ex post efficient. 
This example also gives us an idea of why learning will typically be incom- 
plete. In particular, since optimal offers remain stationary after n = 3, and trade 
*=5/8  and *=7/16 .  always occurs learning also ceases; in other words, ug lg 
Theorem 3 is a generalization f this insight. 
It should be mentioned here that, in general, following on a realized trade, the 
optimal offer is not unique, and this creates the possibility of hk+l = {NT}, 
despite h k = {T}, (even along the equilibrium path!). The main result on efficiency 
for one sided offers, Theorem 2 below, allows for multiple optimal continuation 
offers, and also takes into account off the equilibrium path play. 
3.2. Existence of equilibrium 
Given the sequential move structure of the take-it-or-leave-it offer game, it is 
natural to refine the Nash requirement a the stage-game to allow for sequential 
rationality. I require that given the beliefs of the seller about the buyer's 
valuations, Gn, the strategy pair, {gn, b,}, constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the n th 
stage game that satisfies equential rationality for the buyer. Also note that given 
the specification of the seller's game, observation of history is relevant for the 
offers of the seller only, a fact that greatly simplifies the analysis. In particular, we 
require that the seller simply starts afresh, whenever he faces what he regards as a 
privately inconsistent history. Definition 2.1 can now be reformulated as follows: 
Definition 3.1. An equilibrium is a sequence of strategy-belief pairs, {(~, G~)}~= 1, 
such that for any n, the following is true. 
1. Given G~, the strategy pair for the n 'h stage game, {g~, b~} satisfies, 
( i)7rb([~.( Vb, S)) >1 7rb( b, v b, s), Vb ~ [0,11, Vs ~ [0,11, V v b ~ [0,1] 
(i i)7r:(g.( us, h') ,  b. IG.) >! 7r.'(s, b. lG.), Vs~ [0,1], Vv, ~ [0,1] 
2. The beliefs of the seller, Gn, are derived from {~', hA}, as follows: (a) If the 
seller knows that h n is inconsistent w.r.t. ~" then, G" = G. 
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(b) If h n is k < (n - 1) onward consistent w.r.t. ~n, then by an application of 
Bayes' Rule, 
G(x)-C(l~) 
G,(x )  = a (u] ) -G( t~)  for x~ [l~,u]] and 
I I  n Gn(x ) = 1, for x> Ug, and Gn = 0, for x> lg 
The idea of sequential rationality (within the stage-game) is incorporated in the 
requirement that the buyer's response is optimal with respect o all s ~ [0,1], not 
just the equilibrium offer s n. It will be assumed, in the discussion of the seller's 
game that when faced with an offer s n = vb, the buyer always accepts. 
The first step in the analysis is an existence theorem. The proof of existence 
involves showing that there exists an infinite sequence of strategy-belief pairs 
which satisfies, for every finite stage n, certain conditions. To this end, the first 
step is a characterization of the sequentially rational strategies for the n th stage 
game, given any beliefs G n. It is shown that equilibrium strategies for the stage 
game have a particularly simple structure: a buyer at any stage accepts an offer if 
and only if v b >1 s n. (Lemma 1.1. in the appendix). Next I consider a sequence {t,, 
Gn}:= 1, where the beliefs satisfy condition 2 in Definition 3.1. To demonstrate 
existence I have to show that for every n, a strategy pair, t,, satisfying condition 1, 
in Definition 3.1, exists. 
Theorem 1. There exists a sequence of  strategy-belief pairs, {tn, Gn}~= 1, such that 
for any n, Conditions i and 2 in the equilibrium definition are satisfied. 
3.3. Learning and efficiency 
An equilibrium is LR ex post efficient if trade occurs for all stages after some 
finite stage when v b > v~, while trade does not occur after some finite stage if 
v b < v s. I begin by establishing that any equilibrium has the latter property. 
Proposition 2.1. I f  v b < v s then in any equilibrium continuation, h k = {NT}, 
Vk>~n. 
The proof consists of showing that sn(v s) >1 vs for all v s, at all stages in an 
equilibrium continuation. Given the description of buyer's strategy this implies 
that if v b < v~ then h k = {NT}, for all stages. 
I next consider the situation where the valuations are compatible, i.e., v b > v s. I 
show that in any equilibrium continuation, h k = {T}, after some finite stage. 
Proposition 2.2 establishes the claim for continuations from inconsistent and zero 
histories and Proposition 2.3 considers all other histories. 
There are two steps in the proof of Proposition 2.2. First, it is shown that if 
v b > v s then there is some finite N(Vb,  Vs) , such that h N = {T}; second, it is shown 
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that there is some IQ>>.N(vb, vs), such that Vk~>A ?, hk= {T}. (In the uniform 
priors case, we saw that once an offer has been accepted then at all subsequent 
stages it is the unique optimal offer for the seller. This is not true in general, and 
that motivates the second step in the analysis.) 
The intuition behind the first step can be seen in the example with uniform 
priors: For every stage in which trade does not occur, at the following stage the 
seller truncates the support of the distribution of the buyer's valuation. If trade 
never occurs then this process of truncation has the following general implication: 
Lemma 2.2.1. u*g(vs, h ~ = {NT})  = v s and  l~(v s, h ~ -- {NT})  = O. 
Given ha= {NT}, it follows that for every k >/n, sk ( . )=  ukg + 1(.). However, 
by assumption, v b > vs, and so it follows from Lemma 2.2.1 that there must exist 
some stage k*/> n in which the optimal offer of the seller gk.(vs, h k* = {NT}) ~< 
%. Given the requirement of sequential rationality in Definition 3.1., this implies 
that the buyer accepts the offer for this stage and that contradicts the hypothesis 
that trade never occurs. Thus if v b > v s then there is some finite stage k such that 
h k = {Z}. 
The argument in the second step builds on this result and shows that if v b > v s 
then the outcome 'no trade' cannot occur infinitely often. If no trade occurs then 
the process of truncation is active, and leads over time to a situation in which the 
probability mass gets concentrated on a smaller range of values of the buyer's 
valuation. In particular, if no trade occurs infinitely often (henceforth denoted by 
i.o.) then, in the limit, I obtain the following: 
Lemma 2.2.2. Suppose v b > v s. Then U*g(Vs, h, = (NT) i.o.) = lg(v s, h k = (NT} 
i.o) = %. 
(Lemmas 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 appear to be inconsistent. To see that they are not, 
note that in the latter it is assumed that v b > v s and this implies (from the above 
arguments) that there is some k such that h k = {T}; in other words, if v b > v s then 
in equilibrium h °~ = {NT} is ruled out.) 
The essential trade-off in the optimization problem of the seller is between the 
higher payoff that results from a higher bid (if it is successful) as against he lower 
probability of its acceptance. Lemma 2.2.2 shows that if 'no trade' occurs very 
often then the probability mass will get concentrated over a smaller and smaller 
support; this implies that over time the trade-off moves increasingly in favour of a 
bid closer to the lower bound of the support of the posterior beliefs of the sellers. 
The proof of Proposition 2.2 formalizes this intuition and shows that at some finite 
point, the loss from the lowering of probability of trade becomes ufficiently high 
to make the infimum of the support, l*g(vs), the optimal bid of the seller. In 
equilibrium play since v b >>. l~g(Vs), this results in trade and also implies that there 
is no truncation of support, at the subsequent stage. Hence, the optimal bid 
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remains the same from that point onwards, so does the seller's bid and also the 
trade outcome. I can now state, 
Proposition 2.2. Suppose v b > v s. In any equilibrium continuation, from a history 
h ~ s.t., G ,=G,  there is some N(Vb, vs)>~n , such that for all k>~N(vb, Vs) ,
hk = {T}. 
Proposition 2.3 extends the above result to the case of some stage onward 
consistent histories. 
Proposition 2.3. Suppose v b > v s. In any equilibrium continuation from h&tory h n 
which is k (where k < n) onward consistent, there is some N(vo, v s) >1 n such that 
Vk>~N(vt,, vs) , h~= {T}. 
(The arguments in the proof of Proposition 2.3 are similar to those presented in 
the proof of Proposition 2.2. and are omitted; for details see Goyal (1991)). 
The above results are obtained in the setting of the seller's game; since the 
buyer's game is symmetric, they are also true for the corresponding buyer's game. 
This allows me to state the following general result. 
Theorem 2. Al l  equilibria with one-sided offers based bargaining are LR ex post 
efficient. 
The interest now turns to the nature of long-run learning in such equilibria. For 
the case where v b < vs, Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.2.1 together imply that 
learning is always incomplete. On the other hand, if v b > v s, arguments from 
Proposition 2.2 show that after some finite stage, since trade takes place at the 
same price no further learning is possible. Given that at any finite stage, the 
support of a seller's belief distribution is non-degenerate, his allows me to state 
the following result. 
Theorem 3. In any equilibrium with one-sided offers based bargaining, learning is 
incomplete, generically. 
It is worth adding that this incomplete l arning is not due to the assumption that 
sellers cannot observe prices at which previous trades have taken place. To see 
why this is the case it is instructive to look at the example presented in section 3.1: 
If the seller observes the price at which trade takes place at n = 2, it would make 
no difference to his posterior belief at n = 3 and hence no difference to the 
optimal offer by him at n = 3. 
4. Two-sided offers, learning and efficiency 
The analysis of the two-sided offers bargaining model is done in terms of 
examples. The idea of these examples i to illustrate the wide range of possibilities 
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- from extreme inefficiency to LR ex post efficiency - in different equilibria of 
the infinite game when bargaining is based on two-sided offers. 
Example 1: (Extreme inefficiency) 
Vn, {s. = 1, Vvs ~ [0,1]; b. = 0, Vv b ~ [0,1]}. 
It is easy to show that this sequence of strategy pairs can be sustained in an 
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, no trade or learning ever takes place. 
Example 2: (Some learning, some gains from trade) 
Vn, {b. =0,  Vv b ~ [0 ,1 /2) ;  = 1/2,  Vv b ~ [1/2,1]}. 
Vn, {s. = 1/2 ,  Vvs ~ [0,1/2] ;  = 1, Vvs ~ (1/2,1]}.  
It is possible to show that this strategy sequence can be sustained in an 
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, at stage 1, if v s ~< 1 /2  ~< v b, then h a = {T}; 
otherwise not. Is there any learning in this equilibrium? If oh>_-1/2, and 
h a = {T}, then u}(v b) = 1/2  and l}(v b) --- 0. On the other hand if v b > v s > 1/2,  
and h I = {NT}, then from the knowledge of equilibrium strategies (and personal 
valuations), the buyer at stage 2 does learn that v~ > 1/2.  However, this learning 
is not usefully employed, by him or any later buyer since they all bid b,, = 1/2,  
despite knowing that the probability of trade is zero. 
It is this 'unreasonableness' of these buyer bids that motivates the construction 
of the following equilibrium, which is LR ex post efficient. Details of the proof 
showing that this is an equilibrium of the infinite stage game are given in the 
appendix. 
Example 3: (LR ex post efficient equilibrium) 
Consider the following strategies-beliefs sequence: 
Strategies: 
For stage 1, 
bl (Vb)=O,  for v b~ O, ;=-~, fo r  v b~ ,1 . 
ga(v , )=-~, f ° rv  b~ O, ; - -1 ,  fo rv  b~ ,1 . 
For stage n, 
If h" = {NT}, 
[ 1 [5 5) b.(v b , - )=0, fo r  vb~ 0, ;=~7, fo r  vo~ , ; . . . .  ; 
2" -1  [2" -1  } 
- - -  for v b ~ 1 . 2 n , 2 n , 
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g,(v s , . )=-~, fo r  vs~ 0, 2 " ' f ° r  vs~ 2" . . . . .  ' 
2 " -1  
= l ,  for v ,~ 2" ,1] .  
If h" is s.t. for some 1 ~<k~<(n-2), hk={NT}, and h"/k={T}, then b.(vb, 
hn)=bn_l(Vb, hn-1) ,  and ~.(v~, h" )=£._1(v  s, h"- l ) .  
If h" is s . t .h . _z={T},  but h._I={NT}, then b.(vb, hn)=b l (vb) ,  g.(vs, 
h") = gl(v). 
If h" is commonly known to be k ~ n - 1 onward consistent, then (b.,  g.)" are 
defined using the rules above w.r.t, histories h "/k. 
Beliefs: For stage 1, F~ = F, G 1 = G; For stage n, if h" is consistent then F. and 
G. are derived via Bayes' Rule, using all history. For stage n, if h" is s.t. 
h._ 2 = {T}, but h._ ~ = {NT}, then history is commonly known to be inconsistent 
and F. = F and G. = G. For h. which is k ~< n - 1 onward consistent, F. and G. 
are derived via Bayes' Rule, using k onward history h "/k. Finally, if h" is s.t. 
h._ ~= {T}, and some type of some player knows, (but this is not commonly 
known), that PrObF. - (h~_ 1 = {T}) = 0, or Proba. - (h , _  1 = {T}) = 0, then for that 
type, F, = F,_ 1, or G, = G,_ 1, depending on whether he is a buyer or a seller. 
To see that this equilibrium is LR ex post efficient, let us consider a particular 
pair of realizations. Suppose that v b = 4/9 ,  v s = 3/9.  Then, bl(vb = 4 /9 )  = 0, 
and ga(vs = 3 /9 )  = 1/2,  hence h a = {NT}. In stage 2, bz(vb = 4/9 ,  h 1 = {NT}) 
= 1 /4  and gz(Vs = 3 /9 ,  h a = {NT}) = 1/2,  hence h 2 = {NT}. In stage 3, b3(vb 
=4/9 ,  h 3={NT})=3/8  and £3(v~=3/9,  h 3={NT}=3/8 .  The bids are 
compatible and h 3 = {T}. Given that h 2= {NT}, and h 3 = {T}, b4(') b3( ' )  and 
g4(') = s3('), which implies h 4 = {T}, and so on . . . .  for all k >1 3. Similar argu- 
ments work for other compatible pairs. Moreover, from the description of the 
equilibrium strategies it is clear that if v b < v~ then no trade occurs. 
A closer scrutiny of the general structure of the stage-game quilibrium 
strategies reveals an interesting feature: If v b > v s then in every stage at least one 
of the traders bids with some intention to trade. Formally, there is some 0 < E < 
1/2,  such that 
s,( vs) <~ u~( vs) - e(u~( v~) - us) and/or  b, >1 l;( vb) + e( v b -- Q( %) ). 
Moreover, in the above equilibrium, once trade occurs, traders persist with the 
same bids and offers. From the above example, it is easily seen that this has the 
implication of limiting learning to the stages before trade first takes place. In 
particular, for the valuations considered, for the sellers, ugk _- 1 /2  and lgk = 3/8  
and, for the buyers, u~ --- 3 /8  and l~ = 1/4,  for all k >/3. This argument is quite 
general and holds for all compatible pairs of valuations. If valuations are incom- 
patible learning is naturally incomplete since no seller (buyer) makes a b id /o f fe r  
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lower (higher) than his own valuation. These observations put together suggest 
that learning in the equilibrium given in Example 3 will typically be incomplete. 
Example 3 can be generalized to show that any equilibrium of the infinite game 
in which the stage-game strategies have these properties i  LR ex post efficient 
and also exhibits incomplete learning, generically. The formal statements and 
proofs may be found in Goyal (1993). 
Example 3 also helps us to illustrate a problem with the common knowledge of 
inconsistent histories (alluded to in section 2 above). Suppose that v, < v b < 1/2, 
and that at stage 1, h 1 = {T}. Given common knowledge of equilibrium strategies, 
at stage 2, the buyer knows that history is inconsistent, since bl(v b < 1/2)  = 0 < 
s,(vs), Vo, ~ [0,1]. However, such a buyer also knows that a seller with v s ~< 1 /2  
does not know that the history is inconsistent, since b 1 >t 1/2 = s1(v s ~ 1/2)  is 
possible, given 61 and G 1 = G. In other words, inconsistency of history is not 
commonly known. This problem is intrinsic to the nature of two-sided incomplete 
information, and can arise even if bids/offers of previous traders were common 
knowledge. 
5. Conclusion 
Typically, in bilateral bargaining traders are incompletely informed about the 
true valuations of their opponent. Such incompleteness of information, it is well 
known, can result in bargaining outcomes which are inefficient. This paper shows 
that, in a general class of environments where trading is sequential, learning from 
historical data can help overcome this problem and lead to long run ex post 
efficient outcomes. The extent of long run learning about opponents' valuations is 
also examined. It is shown to be incomplete, generically. 
Appendix: proofs 
Fact L Consider the sequence, {t,, G,}:= 1. Assume that {Gn} satisfy condition 2, 
in the equilibrium definition, and t k exists and is well defined Vk <~ n. Then at 
n+l  stage (n+ l), Vh"+l ~H ", support G ,+l=[ l~ +1, Ug"+l], for some O<~lg 
u~g +1 <~ 1. 
Proof. The proof is in two parts: First it is shown that, for v, ~ [0,1], •k ~< n, 
= =r l  n+l ug ]. An support G k [l~, u~]. Then it is shown that support G,+ 1 L. z , ,÷z 
application of the principle of induction then completes the proof. The proof is 
straightforward and omitted. For details the reader may refer to Goyal (1991). 
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Lemma 1.1. Given beliefs, Gn, {s,, b n} are sequentially rational strategies for the 
n th stage game, if, and only if, they satisfy the following." 
(i) s.(v., h . /G. )  = argmax, ( s -v . )dG. (b ) ,Vs~ [l", u"]; 
- v , ) ,  Vs < l";0, Vs > u"} (s 
( ii) b,( vb, s,) =a ifvb >... Sn;=rifvb <S .. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward and omitted. 
Theorem 1. I use an argument based on induction. Clearly, b, satisfying 
condition (ii) in lemma 1.1 always exists. The focus is on the nature of the pay-off 
function of the seller, 7rS(s~(v~, h"), bn/G,). I show that, for any n, for each 
realization of the valuation of the seller, it is a continuous function, with respect o 
s ~ [0,1]. An application of Weierstrass's Theorem, then completes the proof. 
Stage Game 1: For any v, ~ [0,1], zr~((v~, s), b, [G) = (s - vs)(G(1) - G(s)), 
for s ~ [0,1]. Given that G is continuously differentiable, ~-~(.) is a continuous 
function for all s ~ [0,1]. Hence, by Weirstrass's Theorem, Sl(V ~) is well defined 
for all realizations of v~. 
Stage Game 2: The seller in the 2 "a stage game receives the history, h 2, from 
the first stage. In particular, h 2= {T} or {NT}. Suppose, that h 2= T, then the 
support G, = [s~(vs), 1], by Bayes' updating. The pay-off to the seller can now be 
defined as follows, 
./mS(s, b2/G2) 
= {(s  -- vs)(G2(l ) - O2(s ) ) ,  Vs i> s,(Vs); ( s -  Us), Vs < s,(Vs) } (1) 
Simplifying, one can see that, 
((s-vs)(1-G(s)) 
(S-Vs)(G2(1) -G2(s ) )  = (l_G(Sl(Us)) (2) 
Now, given the assumptions on G, it follows that 7r~ is a continuous function. 
Analogous arguments can be used to show continuity in the case that h 1 = {NT}. 
An application of Weierstrass Theorem then establishes that the maximand is well 
defined and obtained at some s ~ [0,1]. 
Stage n: Suppose that Vv~ ~ [0,1], s~ is well defined for k ~ n. Consider the 
n + 1 ~h stage. 
Stage (n + 1): Given that G, satisfies condition 2 in Def 2.1. and s k is well 
defined for k~<n, from Fact 1 support Gn+ ~ =[l~ +a, n+al Ug j. If [lg, Ug] =[0,1], 
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sn+ i is well defined using arguments form stage 1. If not, i.e., h n- 1 is consistent, 
,+1 n+t < 1, then, for s ~ [/~+ ~, n+l~ and 0 < lg < ug U g .l~ 
"B'nS+ 1(Us, S, bn+ l/Gn+ l) 
= ((S__Us)(Gn+l(Ung+l)__Gn+l(S)) ' ~,~ [/n+l Ug+1]. 
( s -  vs), Vs < In+a; 0, Vs> u n+l) 
Simplifying, 
(s-us)(Gn+l(ung+l)-Gn+1(s)) = (S-Us) 
(G(u:+I)-G(s)) 
(3) 
(4) 
It is easy to check now that '¢v s ~ [0,1], ~Tn+ 1, is a continuous function w.r.t. 
s ~ [0,1], V v~ ~ [0,1]. An application of Weierstrass' Theorem then completes the 
proof. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2.1. Recall that Vk >I n, bk(vb, s k) = b(vb, s k) = a, Vv  b >1 sk; = r, 
V b < s k. To establish the result then I only have to show that seller's optimal 
strategy always prescribes, sk(vs, .) >t v s, for k >/n. When u"g(v s) >1 v s >1 l~(vs) , 
this is immediate from the rationality of the seller; given the nature of history, 
however, it cannot be otherwise. That completes the proof. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.2.1: Fix some realization of the seller's valuation, v s. First, it is 
* exists. Given the hypotheses, (old history) h n can be ignored by shown that ug 
traders tarting at stage n. Since Vk > n, traders make equilibrium bids and offers, 
k+I k Since v b ~[0,1], the sequence ukg(vs) is Bayes' updating implies that ug <~ ug. 
monotonic and bounded between 0 and 1. Hence a limit to the sequence xists and 
u*g(v s) is well defined. 
Next it is shown that u*g(v s) = v,. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose not. 
From Proposition 2.1, since u~(Vs) >1 vs, Vk, it follows that u*g(v~) >1 v s + 6, for 
some 6 > 0. By hypothesis, h k = {NT}, Vk ~> n. Hence, given that G n = G, and 
this is an equilibrium continuation, ukg(vs)=S~_l(V~) , V ~> n and thus for any 
> 0, there is some N(e), such that Vk i> N(e),  u*g(v s) <~ sk(v s) <~ u*g(v,) + e. It 
is shown that this contradicts the optimality of s~ for some k ~< N(e).  
Take a point x, where v s <x  < u*g(v s) such that G(u*) -G(x )=~> 0. The 
pay-off to the seller at any stage, k >~ n is given by 
71":( Us, X, h k= {ur}) ~--(x-  Us) (Gk(u k-l) -Gk(X)) ~ (x - -  Us)g> 0 
(s) 
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On the other hand, for any k >/n, the pay-off to an equilibrium offer, g,(vs), 
will be given by 
s,( ... = { )) = ( s( ,.) - ,.)( ) - G( ,.) ) 
c(u:) 
~< (1 - v,) (6) G(u~) 
Since G is continuous, limk_~= G(ukg)=G(u*). Hence, limk_~= zr~(sk(v ~, 
h k = {NT}) ~ 0. The pay-off rom offering x is bounded away from 0, and so this 
contradicts the optimality of ~,(v~) for some k>N(E) .  Thus, u*g(vs, h ~= {/qT}) 
= D~. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.2.2. First, note that the existence of limits follows from standard 
arguments, as elaborated in Lemma 2.2.1 above. Since this is a sequence of beliefs 
generated by equilibrium play, starting from G, = G, Bayes' updating implies that 
l~g(v~) <<. v b, and u~(v s) >1 v b for k ~> n. Thus l~(v s) and u*g(v~) exist and l~(v~) 
< "b < u~(.,). 
I next show that when h k = {NT}, i.o., u*g(v s) = l~(vs) = v b. Suppose not, then 
given that u] >/v b and l~ < Vb, it must be the case that u*g(v~) >1 Ig(v~) + 8, for 
some 6 > 0. By hypothesis, h k = {NT}, i.o. for k>~ n. Since u~(v,) ~ u*g(v~), for 
any small e > 0, there is some k(e), such that Vk/> k(e), ugg(Vs) < u*g(v s) + e. 
Now we can, using arguments very similar to Lemma 2.2.1, show that there is 
some bid lying strictly between l~(v~) and u*g(v~) which will, for all stages after 
some stage, k, strictly dominate any bid sk(v ~) > u*g(vs). If h k = {NT} i.o., then 
for some such stage despite s k < u:(v~), hk={NT}, implying that u~+l(v~)< 
u*g(v~). It follows from Bayes' formula that u"g(v~) is (at least weakly) monotoni- 
cally decreasing across time, this contradicts he hypothesis that uS(v,) ~ u* (vs). 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2.2. Given that support G k = [lko, uS], (From Fact 1, in the 
appendix), for a seller making an offer sk(v s) ~ [/~g(vs), u§(vs)], the pay-off is: 
~r:(s,(v,,hk),b,/G,)=(s,(v,)-v,) ~(u~_G( lkg  ) (7) 
Differentiating and simplifying, w.r.t, the offer of the seller s, we get, 
g(s ) . ( s - .3  ) (s) 
From Lemma 2.2.2 above, limk~=ukg(v,)= v b = limk_,=lkg(v,), and so it fol- 
lows from the continuity of G and g that there is some k*, such that Vs n ~ [lg k*, 
k$ vs  ug ], zr, ((v,, s), b, ]Gk.)< 0. Thus the optimal offer for the seller sk.(v ,) = 
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lkg*(V~). Given that lkg*(V~) is equal to an accepted offer at some stage k < k* in 
the past, this implies that at stage k* in equilibrium, bk,(vb, gk,(v,)= k, [g )=a .  
Bayes' updating then implies that Gk.+~ = Gk.. Hence, at stage k*-+-1 too, 
k* gk*+ l(v~) = lg (v~) and hk,÷l = {T}. An application of the principle of induction 
completes the proof. Q.E.D. 
Example 3. (Proof that the strategies and beliefs are an equilibrium.) First, we 
consider the beliefs. So long as history is fully (or some stage onward) consistent, 
the sequence of beliefs, {F,, G,}, is derived by Bayes' Rule, thus satisfying 
requirement (2)(b) in Definition 2.1. If history is commonly known to be inconsis- 
tent, then (F,, G,), satisfy the rule for such histories, stated in Definition 2.1. If 
history is privately but not commonly known to be inconsistent then, since no 
restriction applies, the above construction meets the requirement of Definition 2.1. 
The strategies are now examined. First note that given some history, mono- 
tonicity of strategies w.r;t., valuations follows from description of equilibrium. 
Stage 1: Consider b r Suppose v b ~ [0,1/2), then given F 1 =F  and gl, 
7rb(bt(vb) = 0, gl /F )  = 0. For any bid b ~ [0,1], ~'b(1/2 > b > 0, gt /F )  = O, 
and 7r~(b/> 1/2, gl/F) < 0. This establishes optimality of b 1 for v b ~ [0,1/2). 
For v b ~ [1/2,1], ~'b(bl(v b) = 1/2, g/F )  = (v b -- 1/2)Probe(v s ~< 1/2) > 0; For 
other possible bids b ~ [0,1], 7r~(bl(v b) < 1/2, g l /F )  = 0; ~(b  > 1/2,  g l /F )  
= (v b - (1/2 + b)/(2))PrObF(V ~<~ 1/2) ~< (v b - 1/2)Probe(v~ < 1/2). Thus b 1 
is optimal for v b ~ [1/2,1]. This proves optimality of b r A similar argument 
holds for the seller's trategy, ~l- 
Stage (n -  1): Suppose that given any h "-1, (bn-1, g, 1) constitutes an 
equilibrium. 
Stage n: We show that (bn, g,) is an equilibrium of the n th stage game. 
Consider the buyer at stage n, with a true valuation ~b, s.t., ~b E [ / /2  "-1, 
(I + 1)/2 ~- 1). We consider each of the possible cases next. 
Suppose, to begin, that at stage n, h" = {NT}, and so (F,, G,) are derived via 
Bayes' Rule, using the full history. From (bn-1, s,-1) buyer n knows that 
bn-l(~:b) = 1/2"-1. Since h._ 1 = {NT}, it follows that g._ 1(Us)> I /2" -1 .  and so 
given s.-1, l T (vb)=I /2n- I  We show that b. is optimal given the posterior 
beliefs, In, and the seller's strategy, g.. If ~b ~ [2I/2"), (2 I+ 1)/2'I), then 
7r~(b.(v b) <~ 21/2 ", g. /F )  = (v b - 2I /2n)Probe(v. <~ 21/2 ") = 0; 7r~b((2I + 
1)/2" > b.(v b) > 2 I /2" ,  ~ . /F )  = (v b - b)Probe (v ~ ~< 2I /2" )  = 0; ~'b(bn(v b) > 
(21+ 1)/2", g./F . )  = (~b -- b)Pr°bF.(V~ >t (21 + 1)/2") < 0, since ~z, < 21+ 
1}{2", and PrObF(V ~/> (21 + 1)/2") > 0. Thus for ~b ~ [2I/2", (21+ 1)/2"), 
b.(v b) = 21 /2  ~ is optimal. Similar arguments may be adduced to establish the 
optimality of b. for other values of v b. 
Suppose next that h "- 1 = {NT}, but h n_ 1 = {T}. If vb ~ [2I/2", (21 + 1)/2"), 
from (b._ 1, s . - l )  buyer n knows that b ._ l (~b)=I /2  "-1. Since h " -1 -  {NT}, 
and h._ 1 = {T}, it follows that sn-l(V~) <~ I /2" -1 ,  and given g._ i, l~(vb) = ( I -  
1)/2 n- 1; and uT(~: b) = I /2  n- 1. We wish to show that given this belief, b,~ = b._ 1 
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= 2 I /2"  is optimal, zrf(b,(Vb) < 2/,/2", g, /F )  <~ v b. PrObF(V s</, /2 "-1) = 0, 
since Probv(l~(va)) = 0; 7r, b(b,(vb) = 2I /2" ,  g , /F , )  = v b -- 2/ /2" )  Prob F (v s 
,<< 2 I /2" ) - " (v  0 - 2I/2");  zrf((2I + 1)/2" > > " ^ - " b.(v o) 2 / /2 ,  s , / F , ) - (v  o -  
(b + (21/2"))/(2)).  PrObF(V s~ 21/2") < (v b -- 2/ /2");  ~f(b > (2I + 1)/2", 
g. /F . )  = (~b - (b + (2I + i)/2 )/(2)). Probv(v~ < (21 + 1)/2") < v b - 2 / /2" ,  
since b,(v b) >/(2I + 1)/2", and Probv(v ~ ~< (21+ 1)/2") = 1. Thus for ~b ~ 
[2I/2", (2•+ 1)/2"), b,^is optimal. Similar arguments may be adduced to 
establish the optimality of b, for other v 0. 
Consider off-equilibrium path histories next. Suppose h" is commonly known 
to be inconsistent. Given that G n = G and F" =F,  (b', g,)= (b,, g,) is an 
equilibrium following arguments for stage 1. If h" is some stage onward consis- 
tent, then arguments analogous to those above may be applied for h "/k consistent 
histories. 
Suppose that h" is s.t., h ' -  2 = {NT} h'_ 1 = {T}, but one and only one player, 
(say) the buyer, with valuation vb, knows that ProbF. - (Vs: 6"_ l(Vb) ~> g'-a(Vs)) = 
0, i.e., h" is inconsistent. Then by construction, F" = F'_ 1, and b'(~b) = bn- l(vb) -
We demonstrate hat 6"_ l(~b) is optimal, given F~ = F,_I, and ~,. Suppose, for 
instance, that t3 b ~ [1/2"-  1, 1 + 1/2"-  t), and so b,,_ 1(~6) =/ /2" -  1. At stage n, 
by hypothesis this history is not commonly known to be inconsistent. In this case, 
for ~s ~ [1/2._ 1, I + 1/2"_ t, history is consistent, and thus for such valuations, 
g'(vs) = g'- l .  Also note that for other seller valuations ince history is inconsis- 
tent, by hypothesis, they also play, s,(v~)=s,_l(vs).  Since F ,_ I=F , ,  the 
optimality of b, then follows from the hypothesis that b,_, is optimal. Analogous 
reasoning as in the case of consistent histories is sufficient to establish optimality 
of g'. An application of the principle of induction ow completes the argument for 
existence. Q.E.D. 
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